



THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM  
ISRAEL INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES

# 28th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory on Mechanism Design

27 June - 6 July, 2017

All lectures will take place at the Israel Institute for Advanced Studies,  
on the Edmond J. Safra, Givat Ram Campus Room #130

**Director:**

**Eric Maskin** (Harvard University)

**Co-Directors:**

**Elchanan Ben-Porath** (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

**Stephen Morris** (Princeton University)

# Program

## Tuesday, 27 June

- 09:00 - 10:00    Registration
- 10:00 - 10:10    Greetings
- 10:10 - 12:10    **Eric Maskin** (Harvard University)  
Introduction to Mechanism Design: General Preferences
- 12:10 - 13:30    Lunch
- 13:30 - 15:30    **Eric Maskin** (Harvard University)  
Introduction to Mechanism Design: Quasi-linear Preferences
- 15:30 - 16:00    Coffee Break
- 16:00 - 17:30    **Ariel Rubinstein** (Tel Aviv University)  
A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent
- 17:30 - 19:30    Reception

## Wednesday, 28 June

- 09:30 - 11:00    **Balazs Szentes** (London School of Economics)  
Dynamic Contracts with Evolving Types, Part I
- 11:00 - 11:30    Coffee Break
- 11:30 - 13:00    **Sylvain Chassang** (New York University)  
Robust Dynamic Contracting
- 13:00 - 14:30    Lunch

14:30 - 16:00 **Eddie Dekel** (Tel Aviv University)  
Evidence in Games and Mechanism Design

### Thursday, 29 June

09:30 - 11:00 **Elchanan Ben-Porath** (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)  
Mechanisms with Evidence: Robustness and Commitment

11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 - 13:00 **Balazs Szentes** (London School of Economics)  
Dynamic Contracts with Evolving Types, Part II

13:00 - 14:30 Lunch

14:30 - 16:00 **Sylvain Chassang** (New York University)  
Data-Driven Policy Design

18:00 - 20:00 Concert by Eric Maskin - held at the Jerusalem Music Center

### Friday, 30 June

09:00 - 10:30 **Emir Kamenica** (University of Chicago)  
Persuasion vs. incentives

10:30 - 11:00 Coffee Break

11:00 - 12:30 **Ben Brooks** (University of Chicago)  
Information design and robust predictions

12:30 - 13:30 Lunch at the IIAS Lobby

### Saturday, 1 July

09:00 - 18:30 Tour to Masada and the Dead Sea

## Sunday, 2 July

- 09:30 - 11:00 **Emir Kamenica** (University of Chicago)  
How to represent information
- 11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break
- 11:30 - 13:00 **Ben Brooks** (University of Chicago)  
Information design meets mechanism design
- 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch
- 14:30 - 16:00 **Vasiliki Skerta**  
Two lectures on Informed Principal, Part A

## Monday, 3 July

- 09:30 - 11:00 **Stephen Morris** (Princeton University)  
Informationally Robust Mechanism Design, I
- 11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break
- 11:30 - 13:00 **Sergiu Hart** (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)  
Two(!) Good To Be True
- 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch
- 14:30 - 16:00 **Vasiliki Skerta**  
Two lectures on Informed Principal, Part B

## Tuesday, 4 July

- 09:30 - 11:00 **Stephen Morris** (Princeton University)  
Informationally Robust Mechanism Design, II
- 11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break
- 11:30 - 13:00 **Jakub Kastl** (Princeton University)  
Empirical Analysis of Multiunit Auctions

13:00 - 14:00 Lunch

14:00 - 18:00 Tour to the Old City

### Wednesday, 5 July

09:30 - 11:00 **Jakub Kastl** (Princeton University)  
Empirical Analysis of Education Markets

11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 - 13:00 **Tim Roughgarden** (Stanford University)  
The Price of Anarchy and Equilibrium Welfare  
Guarantees for Simple  
Auctions

13:00 - 14:30 Lunch

14:30 - 16:15 Poster Session

16:15 - 17:30 **Kenneth Arrow Commemoration Event**

17:30 - 18:30 **Stephen Morris** (Princeton University)  
Arrow lecture:  
Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information

19:00 - 20:30 Dinner

### Thursday, 6 July

09:30 - 11:00 **Tim Roughgarden** (Stanford University)  
Communication Complexity and Impossibility  
Results for Simple Auctions

11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 - 13:00 **Jason Hartline** (Northwestern University)  
Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design and  
Approximation. Part I, multi - agent  
mechanisms

13:00 - 14:30 Lunch

14:30 - 16:00 **Jason Hartline** (Northwestern University)  
Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design and  
Approximation. Part II, single - agent  
mechanisms